A 100% ecological path without degrowth: Quantified Diagnosis and a Portfolio of Economically Viable Solutions (French version - FR)

Personal working note - Éric Jacob - July 2026

Starting Premise

Any climate solution that imposes a short-term reduction in material comfort will be politically rejected by a majority of populations and governments, regardless of how severe the long-term stakes are. This text takes that observation as a hard, non-negotiable constraint, and seeks solutions that simultaneously produce economic wealth, employment, and a net-negative carbon balance — without relying on deprivation, punitive taxation, or imposed degrowth.

I. Detailed Quantified Diagnosis

1.1 The current global carbon budget

1.2 The measured weakening of carbon sinks (this is recent data, not a projection)

In 2023, the rise in CO₂ concentration hit a record (+3.37 ppm over the year, the largest annual increase measured since 1958), even though fossil emissions had barely grown (+0.6%). The published scientific explanation (Global Carbon Project, Nature Climate Change 2025): the land sink collapsed, mainly due to:

• drought in the Amazon (net carbon loss — the forest switched from sink to source over this period);
• extreme wildfires in Canada;
• a drop in biomass yield in the Sahel and southern Africa (El Niño-linked drought).

On the ocean side: rising surface temperatures reduce CO₂ solubility, causing abnormal outgassing in subtropical and subpolar zones (especially in the Northern Hemisphere), which cut ocean absorption by about 10% below expected levels that year. Researchers explicitly note that this relative resilience may not hold under prolonged warming or more severe marine heatwaves.

Diagnostic conclusion: the two largest natural sinks on the planet are already showing signs of synchronized weakening — not in 50 years, but within the already-observed year 2023. The system is losing absorption capacity at the very moment global energy demand (AI, data centers, electrification) is accelerating.

1.3 Why Carbon Capture Technology Alone Is Not Enough

A Haffner Energy H6 module (2 MW) sequesters roughly 5,250 to 6,300 tonnes of CO₂/yr via biochar. To offset all global fossil emissions (37 Gt/yr), 5.9 to 7 million modules would be needed — i.e., 12 to 14 TW of installed capacity, more than the total electrical capacity installed on the entire planet today (~9 TW, all sources combined). No single capture technology, however good, can therefore solve the problem alone at global scale. A portfolio of combined levers is required.

It is by using the energy by-product (biochar) to revegetate millions of hectares of degraded land that the overall carbon capture capacity of the sector becomes exponential (due to the growth of the new vegetation it has enabled). This role as a biological pump initiator makes biomass thermolysis a key technology for systemic global decarbonization.

[Existing Biomass / Forest Waste]
                   │
                   ▼
         [Haffner Thermolysis] ──► Clean Energy (Syngas / H2)
                   │
                   ▼
            [Active Biochar]
                   │
                   ▼
     [Arid Zone Amendment]
                   │
                   ▼
 [New Vegetation / Reforestation] ──► Massive Additional CO2 Capture

The carbon offset balance of H6 modules:

1,100 people therefore emit approximately 1,100 × 4.5 = 4,950 tonnes of CO₂ per year.

Since an H6 module sequesters between 5,250 and 6,300 tonnes of CO₂ per year, it effectively absorbs (and even slightly exceeds) the total fossil-fuel emissions of its group of 1,100 people.

From an engineering and urban planning perspective, decentralizing production via a 2 MW industrial unit for a neighborhood or village of 1,100 inhabitants represents a perfectly standard and logical technical scale.

A 2 MW module operating continuously (baseload) throughout the year (8,760 hours) generates a total energy output of 2 MW × 8,760 hours = 17,520 MWh/year (or 17.52 GWh/year).

When compared to average total electricity consumption (per capita, per year), the module proves to generate a significant surplus:

• In France/Europe: Average total electricity consumption is approximately 6 to 7 MWh per capita per year.
• In the United States: Consumption is much higher, around 12 to 13 MWh per capita per year.
• Globally: Average consumption is approximately 3.3 MWh per capita per year.

II. The Guiding Principle: Seek Levers Where Ecology Is a Profit, Not a Cost

Each lever selected below meets a strict criterion: it must either generate positive net revenue, create a monetizable asset (carbon credit, raw material, sellable product), or reduce an existing cost. None of the levers in this document rely on a punitive tax, rationing, or imposed reduction in consumption.

2.1 Lever #1 — Reducing fossil methane leaks (fastest, cheapest)

Why it’s a priority: methane has a short atmospheric lifetime (~12 years) but a warming power about 80 times greater than CO₂ over 20 years. Cutting methane leaks acts almost immediately on warming, unlike CO₂, which persists for centuries.

The no-deprivation economic model: most methane emitted by the fossil fuel industry comes from leaks (wells, pipelines, storage sites) — it’s lost natural gas, i.e., lost money for the operator. Plugging these leaks amounts to selling the gas instead of letting it leak: it’s profitable in itself, with no subsidy needed.

2.2 Lever #2 — Decentralized biochar (Haffner-type) from residual feedstocks

The economic model: turns a cost (waste disposal) into two revenue streams (energy + CORC carbon credits + agricultural soil amendment). Already profitable without subsidy according to data from the C-iC H6 module (target OPEX < €2/kg H₂).

2.3 Lever #3 — Enhanced rock weathering in agriculture

The economic model: spreading basalt or olivine powder on farmland captures CO₂ through chemical reaction with rainwater, while also remineralizing soils and improving crop yields (demonstrated effect on several crops). The farmer gains yield AND generates a sellable carbon credit — double revenue for a single action.

2.4 Lever #4 — Reforestation and agroforestry paid via the carbon market

The economic model: a reliable carbon credit market (unlike current voluntary markets, often criticized for lacking rigor) turns a planted hectare into a recurring financial asset for the landowner, without requiring them to give up agricultural income (agroforestry = production + carbon simultaneously).

2.5 Lever #5 — Nuclear and renewables to replace fossil fuels without reducing consumption

The economic model: this lever doesn’t ask anyone to consume less energy — it just changes the source. It’s the only way to keep electrifying AI, transport, and industry without continuing to burn carbon to do it.

2.6 Lever #6 — Industrial valorization of captured CO₂ (CCU, not just CCS)

The economic model: instead of burying captured CO₂ (pure cost), turn it into a sellable product: synthetic fuels (e-fuels, SAF), carbonated construction materials (concrete that hardens by capturing CO₂), biosourced plastics. CO₂ becomes a raw material, not waste.

III. Realistic Combined Timeline (Without Degrowth)

Key point: this timeline relies on no reduction in global energy consumption — on the contrary, it assumes continuous growth in energy production, but with a declining fossil share in favor of nuclear/renewables, and a capture system that progressively becomes profitable in its own right.

IV. What This Model Doesn’t Solve (Necessary Honesty)

• It assumes political will and a stable regulatory framework over 30 to 50 years — the main risk is not technical, it is political and institutional (changes of government, wars, financial crises that interrupt investment).
• Nuclear and DAC have long deployment timelines (10-20 years) that cannot be compressed by willpower or funding alone — these are real physical and industrial constraints (component manufacturing, skilled workforce training, supply chains).
• This model rests on the assumption that “green growth” is achievable at global scale — this is an actively debated point among climate economists: some believe decoupling between GDP growth and emissions is already observed in several countries (UK, Denmark), others judge this decoupling to be too slow relative to the physical urgency. This document takes the side of the first camp by construction (your starting constraint), but this choice deserves to be acknowledged as such, not presented as an undisputed scientific fact.
• None of these levers eliminates the risk of crossing tipping points (permafrost thaw, ocean current collapse) if the pace of deployment remains slower than the weakening of natural sinks observed in 2023-2024.

V. Conclusion

A path without degrowth exists on paper: it combines six levers, each of which produces revenue or an asset rather than a cost, deployed in parallel over 30 to 50 years, with progressive acceleration as each technology moves down its cost curve. None of these levers alone is sufficient — it is their combination and simultaneity that make the calculation possible. The main risk is neither technical nor economic: it is the startup delay relative to natural sinks that are already, today, showing measured signs of weakening.

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